secrets overhaul: use tpm for laptop (need to migrate desktop later)

AGENTS.md

@@ -36,10 +36,11 @@ lib/
   overlays.nix             # jellyfin-exporter, igpu-exporter, reflac, ensureZfsMounts
 patches/nixpkgs/           # applied to nixpkgs-stable for muffin builds
 secrets/
-  desktop/                 # git-crypt: mreow + yarn share these (wifi, nix-cache-netrc, secureboot.tar, password-hash, disk-password)
+  secrets.nix              # agenix recipients (who can decrypt each .age)
+  desktop/                 # agenix *.age (mreow + yarn) + disk-password (install-time only, git-crypt)
   home/                    # git-crypt: per-user HM secrets (api keys, steam id)
-  server/                  # agenix *.age + git-crypt *.nix/*.tar/livekit_keys
+  server/                  # agenix *.age + git-crypt *.nix/*.tar/livekit_keys (muffin)
-  usb-secrets/             # USB-resident agenix identity key (git-crypt inside the repo)
+  usb-secrets/             # USB-resident agenix identity for muffin (git-crypt inside the repo)
 ```
 
 **Never read or write files under `secrets/`.** They are encrypted at rest (git-crypt for plaintext, agenix for `.age`). The git-crypt key is delivered to `muffin` at runtime as `/run/agenix/git-crypt-key-nixos.age`.
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ If Nix complains about a missing file, `git add` it first — flakes only see tr
 | `common-` | imported by ALL hosts | `common-doas.nix`, `common-nix.nix`, `common-shell-fish.nix` |
 | `desktop-` | imported by mreow + yarn only | `desktop-common.nix`, `desktop-steam.nix`, `desktop-networkmanager.nix` |
 | `server-` | imported by muffin only | `server-security.nix`, `server-power.nix`, `server-impermanence.nix`, `server-lanzaboote-agenix.nix` |
-| *(none)* | host-specific filename-scoped; see file contents | `age-secrets.nix`, `zfs.nix`, `no-rgb.nix` (yarn + muffin) |
+| *(none)* | host-specific filename-scoped; see file contents | `zfs.nix`, `no-rgb.nix` (yarn + muffin) |
 
 New modules: pick the narrowest prefix that's true, then add the import explicitly in the host's `default.nix` (there is no auto-discovery).
 
@@ -117,14 +118,18 @@ New modules: pick the narrowest prefix that's true, then add the import explicit
 ## Secrets
 
 - **git-crypt** covers `secrets/**` per the root `.gitattributes`. Initialized with a single symmetric key checked into `secrets/server/git-crypt-key-nixos.age` (agenix-encrypted to the USB SSH identity).
-- **agenix** decrypts `secrets/server/*.age` at activation into `/run/agenix/` on muffin.
+- **agenix** decrypts `*.age` into `/run/agenix/` at activation on every host:
-- **USB identity**: `/mnt/usb-secrets/usb-secrets-key` on muffin; the age identity path is wired in `modules/usb-secrets.nix`.
+  - **muffin**: identity is `/mnt/usb-secrets/usb-secrets-key` (ssh-ed25519 on a physical USB). Wired in `modules/usb-secrets.nix`.
-- **Encrypting a new agenix secret** uses the SSH public key directly with `age -R`:
+  - **mreow + yarn**: identity is `/var/lib/agenix/tpm-identity` (an `age-plugin-tpm` handle sealed by the host's TPM 2.0). Wired in `modules/desktop-age-secrets.nix`; yarn persists `/var/lib/agenix` through impermanence.
+- **Recipients** are declared in `secrets/secrets.nix`. Desktop secrets are encrypted to the admin SSH key + each host's TPM recipient; server secrets stay encrypted to the muffin USB key.
+- **Bootstrap a new desktop**: run `doas scripts/bootstrap-desktop-tpm.sh` on the host. It generates a TPM-sealed identity at `/var/lib/agenix/tpm-identity` and prints an `age1tpm1…` recipient. Append it to the `tpm` list in `secrets/secrets.nix`, run `agenix -r` to re-encrypt, commit, `./deploy.sh switch`.
+- **Encrypting a new server secret** uses the SSH public key directly with `age -R`:
   ```sh
   age -R <(ssh-keygen -y -f secrets/usb-secrets/usb-secrets-key) \
       -o secrets/server/<name>.age \
       /path/to/plaintext
   ```
+  For desktop secrets, prefer `agenix -e secrets/desktop/<name>.age` from a shell with `age-plugin-tpm` on PATH — it reads `secrets/secrets.nix` and encrypts to every recipient listed there.
 - **DO NOT use `ssh-to-age`**. It produces `X25519` recipient stanzas, which the SSH private key on muffin cannot decrypt (it only decrypts `ssh-ed25519` stanzas produced by `age -R` against the SSH pubkey). Mismatched stanzas show up as `age: error: no identity matched any of the recipients` at deploy time.
 - Never read or commit plaintext secrets. Never log secret values.
 
@@ -210,7 +215,7 @@ Prior art: the 3-path `{kernel,initrd,kernel-modules}` diff is lifted from nixpk
 
 - **Privilege escalation**: `doas` everywhere; `sudo` is disabled on every host.
 - **Shell**: fish. `bash` login shells re-exec into fish via `programs.bash.interactiveShellInit` (see `modules/common-shell-fish.nix`).
-- **Secure boot**: lanzaboote. Desktops extract keys from `secrets/desktop/secureboot.tar`; muffin extracts from an agenix-decrypted tar (see `modules/server-lanzaboote-agenix.nix`).
+- **Secure boot**: lanzaboote. Every host extracts keys from an agenix-decrypted tar at activation — desktops via `modules/desktop-lanzaboote-agenix.nix`, muffin via `modules/server-lanzaboote-agenix.nix`.
 - **Impermanence**: muffin is tmpfs-root with `/persistent` surviving reboots (`modules/server-impermanence.nix`); yarn binds `/home/primary` from `/persistent` (`hosts/yarn/impermanence.nix`).
 - **Disks**: disko.
 - **Binary cache**: muffin runs harmonia; desktops consume it at `https://nix-cache.sigkill.computer`.

hosts/muffin/default.nix

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
     ../../modules/zfs.nix
     ../../modules/server-impermanence.nix
     ../../modules/usb-secrets.nix
-    ../../modules/age-secrets.nix
+    ../../modules/server-age-secrets.nix
     ../../modules/server-lanzaboote-agenix.nix
     ../../modules/no-rgb.nix
     ../../modules/server-security.nix

hosts/yarn/impermanence.nix

@@ -12,6 +12,14 @@
       "/var/lib/systemd/coredump"
       "/var/lib/nixos"
       "/var/lib/systemd/timers"
+      # agenix identity sealed by the TPM. Must survive the tmpfs root
+      # wipe so decryption at activation finds the right handle.
+      {
+        directory = "/var/lib/agenix";
+        mode = "0700";
+        user = "root";
+        group = "root";
+      }
     ];
 
     files = [

modules/desktop-age-secrets.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+{
+  pkgs,
+  inputs,
+  ...
+}:
+let
+  # rage cannot invoke age-plugin-tpm unless the plugin binary is on PATH at
+  # activation time. Wrap rage so the activation scripts (and anything else
+  # that picks up `age.ageBin`) get age-plugin-tpm for free.
+  rageWithTpm = pkgs.writeShellScriptBin "rage" ''
+    export PATH="${pkgs.age-plugin-tpm}/bin:$PATH"
+    exec ${pkgs.rage}/bin/rage "$@"
+  '';
+in
+{
+  imports = [
+    inputs.agenix.nixosModules.default
+  ];
+
+  # Expose the plugin + agenix CLI for interactive edits (`agenix -e …`).
+  environment.systemPackages = [
+    inputs.agenix.packages.${pkgs.system}.default
+    pkgs.age-plugin-tpm
+  ];
+
+  age.ageBin = "${rageWithTpm}/bin/rage";
+
+  # Primary identity: TPM-sealed key, generated by scripts/bootstrap-desktop-tpm.sh.
+  # Fallback identity: admin SSH key. age tries paths in order, so if the TPM
+  # is wiped or the board is replaced the SSH key keeps secrets accessible until
+  # the TPM is re-bootstrapped. Both are encrypted recipients on every .age file.
+  age.identityPaths = [
+    "/var/lib/agenix/tpm-identity"
+    "/home/primary/.ssh/id_ed25519"
+  ];
+
+  # Ensure the identity directory exists before agenix activation so a fresh
+  # bootstrap doesn't race the directory creation.
+  systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
+    "d /var/lib/agenix 0700 root root -"
+  ];
+
+  age.secrets = {
+    # Secureboot PKI bundle (db/KEK/PK keys + certs) consumed by lanzaboote
+    # via desktop-lanzaboote-agenix.nix at activation time.
+    secureboot-tar = {
+      file = ../secrets/desktop/secureboot.tar.age;
+      mode = "0400";
+      owner = "root";
+      group = "root";
+    };
+
+    # netrc for the private nix binary cache.
+    nix-cache-netrc = {
+      file = ../secrets/desktop/nix-cache-netrc.age;
+      mode = "0400";
+      owner = "root";
+      group = "root";
+    };
+
+    # yescrypt hash for the primary user.
+    password-hash = {
+      file = ../secrets/desktop/password-hash.age;
+      mode = "0400";
+      owner = "root";
+      group = "root";
+    };
+
+  };
+}

modules/desktop-common.nix

@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
     ./desktop-vm.nix
     ./desktop-steam.nix
     ./desktop-networkmanager.nix
+    ./desktop-age-secrets.nix
+    ./desktop-lanzaboote-agenix.nix
 
     inputs.disko.nixosModules.disko
-    inputs.lanzaboote.nixosModules.lanzaboote
 
     inputs.nixos-hardware.nixosModules.common-cpu-amd-pstate
     inputs.nixos-hardware.nixosModules.common-cpu-amd-zenpower
@@ -50,16 +51,6 @@
       mkdir -p /nix/var/nix/profiles/per-user/root/channels
     '';
 
-    # extract all my secureboot keys
-    # TODO! proper secrets management
-    "secureboot-keys".text = ''
-      #!/usr/bin/env sh
-      rm -fr ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle} || true
-      mkdir -p ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle}
-      ${lib.getExe pkgs.gnutar} xf ${../secrets/desktop/secureboot.tar} -C ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle}
-      chown -R root:wheel ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle}
-      chmod -R 500 ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle}
-    '';
   };
 
   swapDevices = [ ];
@@ -71,7 +62,7 @@
     trusted-public-keys = [
       site_config.binary_cache.public_key
     ];
-    netrc-file = "${../secrets/desktop/nix-cache-netrc}";
+    netrc-file = config.age.secrets.nix-cache-netrc.path;
   };
 
   # cachyos kernel overlay
@@ -896,8 +887,7 @@
       "camera"
       "adbusers"
     ];
-    # TODO! this is really bad :( I should really figure out how to do proper secrets management
+    hashedPasswordFile = config.age.secrets.password-hash.path;
-    hashedPasswordFile = "${../secrets/desktop/password-hash}";
   };
 
   services.gvfs.enable = true;

modules/desktop-lanzaboote-agenix.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+{
+  config,
+  lib,
+  pkgs,
+  inputs,
+  ...
+}:
+{
+  imports = [
+    inputs.lanzaboote.nixosModules.lanzaboote
+  ];
+
+  boot = {
+    loader.systemd-boot.enable = lib.mkForce false;
+
+    lanzaboote = {
+      enable = true;
+      # sbctl expects the bundle at /var/lib/sbctl; muffin uses /etc/secureboot
+      # because it is wiped on every activation there (impermanence) — desktops
+      # extract to the historical sbctl path so existing tooling keeps working.
+      pkiBundle = "/var/lib/sbctl";
+    };
+  };
+
+  system.activationScripts = {
+    # Extract the secureboot PKI bundle from the agenix-decrypted tar. Mirrors
+    # modules/server-lanzaboote-agenix.nix; skip when keys are already present
+    # (e.g., disko-install staged them via --extra-files).
+    "secureboot-keys" = {
+      deps = [ "agenix" ];
+      text = ''
+        #!/bin/sh
+        (
+          umask 077
+          if [[ -d ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle} && -f ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle}/db.key ]]; then
+            echo "secureboot keys already present, skipping extraction"
+          else
+            echo "extracting secureboot keys from agenix"
+            rm -fr ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle} || true
+            install -d -o root -g wheel -m 0500 ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle}
+            ${pkgs.gnutar}/bin/tar xf ${config.age.secrets.secureboot-tar.path} -C ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle}
+          fi
+          chown -R root:wheel ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle}
+          chmod -R 500 ${config.boot.lanzaboote.pkiBundle}
+        )
+      '';
+    };
+  };
+}

modules/desktop-networkmanager.nix

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-{ hostname, site_config, ... }:
+{ hostname, ... }:
 {
   # speed up boot times (by about three seconds)
   systemd.services.NetworkManager-wait-online.enable = false;
@@ -9,7 +9,10 @@
     networkmanager = {
       enable = true;
 
-      appendNameservers = site_config.dns_servers;
+      appendNameservers = [
+        "1.1.1.1"
+        "9.9.9.9"
+      ];
 
       wifi = {
         scanRandMacAddress = true;

scripts/bootstrap-desktop-tpm.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Bootstrap the age-plugin-tpm identity for a desktop host (mreow / yarn).
+#
+# Produces a TPM-sealed age identity at /var/lib/agenix/tpm-identity and
+# prints the legacy `age1tpm1…` recipient. The identity file is a TPM
+# handle, not key material — the actual key never leaves the TPM.
+#
+# --tpm-recipient is required: nixpkgs only ships `age-plugin-tpm`, not the
+# `age-plugin-tag` binary that rage looks up when it sees the new p256tag
+# `age1tag1…` format. Until a packaged age-plugin-tag lands, every recipient
+# stays in the legacy form so encryption works with off-the-shelf nixpkgs.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   doas scripts/bootstrap-desktop-tpm.sh
+#
+# After running:
+#   1. Append the printed recipient to `tpm` in secrets/secrets.nix:
+#        "age1tpm1… <hostname>"
+#   2. `agenix -r` (from a shell with age-plugin-tpm on PATH) to re-encrypt
+#      every desktop secret with the new recipient list.
+#   3. Commit + `./deploy.sh switch`.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+if [[ $EUID -ne 0 ]]; then
+  echo "this script must run as root (access to /dev/tpmrm0 + /var/lib/agenix)" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+host=$(hostname -s)
+id_file=/var/lib/agenix/tpm-identity
+
+install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root /var/lib/agenix
+
+if [[ -f "$id_file" ]]; then
+  echo "existing identity found at $id_file — preserving"
+else
+  echo "generating TPM-sealed age identity..."
+  nix run nixpkgs#age-plugin-tpm -- --generate --tpm-recipient --output "$id_file"
+  chmod 0400 "$id_file"
+  chown root:root "$id_file"
+fi
+
+# Always derive the legacy age1tpm1… recipient, even if the identity file
+# was generated with the newer p256tag comment (Recipient line starts with
+# age1tag1…). `--convert --tpm-recipient` uses the same TPM object and just
+# serializes the public key point in the old format.
+recipient=$(nix run nixpkgs#age-plugin-tpm -- --convert --tpm-recipient < "$id_file" 2>/dev/null | grep -o 'age1tpm1[0-9a-z]*' | head -n1)
+if [[ -z "$recipient" ]]; then
+  # fallback to parsing the header comment (only works when the identity was
+  # already generated with --tpm-recipient).
+  recipient=$(grep '^# Recipient:' "$id_file" | awk '{print $3}')
+fi
+if [[ -z "$recipient" ]]; then
+  echo "failed to derive recipient for $id_file" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+cat <<EOF
+
+recipient for $host:
+  "$recipient $host"
+
+next steps (run on a workstation with git-crypt unlocked):
+  1. edit secrets/secrets.nix and append the line above inside the \`tpm\` list.
+  2. nix run nixpkgs#agenix -- -r   # re-encrypts every .age file.
+  3. git commit + ./deploy.sh switch
+EOF